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ABSTRACT
The Attribution of Freedom by Oneself and an Observer
Robert G. Bringle, B.A., Hanover College
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Ivan D. Steiner
This research was designed to evaluate the impact of behavioral
consistency on an actor's and observer's attribution of freedom. Con-
sistency was defined in terms of (a) the frequency, and constancy of
magnitude, of reinforcing behavior ostensibly emitted by the actor and
(b) the constancy of the entity that was reinforced. Attributed
decision freedom, attributed outcome freedom, and constraints were
examined, and it was predicted that manipulated consistency would have
similar effects on the attributions of observers and participants.
The data provided little evidence that behavioral consistency
affected attributed freedom. Examination of the results suggests that
neither participants nor observers believed the actor had very much out-
come freedom. Support is found for the contention that observation of
behavior can affect inferences such as beliefs and attitudes.
It is clear from the research that behavioral consistency affected
subjects' evaluations of observed behaviors, and their attributions to
the participants who produced them. Furthermore, manipulated
consis-
tency sometimes had markedly different effects on observer
and parti-
cipant. The findings suggest that at least one process
that can result
in divergent inferences between actor and observer
is the availability,
usually only to the actor, of information about what
he expected or tried
to do. Theoretical implications of the results are
discussed.
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The Attribution of Freedom by Oneself
and an Observer"^
Robert Gordon Bringle
University of Massachusetts
Much of the literature on attribution (e.g., Ajzen, 1971; Bern,
1965, 1967; Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones and Harris, 1967;
Kelley, 1967, 1971; Steiner, 1971) has implicitly and explicitly
suggested that inferences concerning another person, based upon observ-
ing his behavior or obtaining information about the nature of the
behavior in which he has ostensibly engaged, depend in part upon the
subject's perception of how free the person was to engage in the
behavior. However, the relevance of the attribution of freedom extends
beyond the attribution process, £er se_. Reactance theory research
(e.g., Brehm, 1966) and dissonance phenomena (e.g., Brehm and Cohen,
1962) are but a few examples in which the role of freedom is crucial.
The theoretical and empirical work of Steiner and his associates
(e.g., Ajzen, 1971; Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and
Steiner, 1971; Kauffman, 1971; Steiner, 1971) has considered both the
antecedants and consequences of the attribution of freedom to another.
This literature begins to probe the relationship between freedom and
the questions, "How do we perceive other people, obtain knowledge
about them, and what consequences does this information have
on our
interactions with them?"
One example involves the role of freedom in attributions
to a
reinforcing agent. Steiner (1971) has suggested that
people's reactions
to the rewards and punishments they receive depend, in part, upon the
amount of freedom they attribute to the agent who administers them.
Recent research (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and
Steiner, 1971) has investigated the kinds of cues on which recipients
of payoffs may base their judgments about an agent's freedom. This
research suggests that the predictability of the reinforcements (across
occasions) helps determine the degree to which the reinforcing agent
is seen as free. Specifically, as the administration of reinforcements
becomes less predictable, the agent is perceived by others as being
more free in determining the nature of his reinforcing behavior.
A related but separate question focuses on the problem: How free
does an individual see himself? It may or may not be true that the
attribution of freedom to oneself depends upon the same cues or anLe-
cedants as does the attribution of freedom to another. It is the pur-
pose of this research to investigate this problem: Attributions of
freedom to oneself.
Current Theoretical Formulations
Jones and Nisbett (1971) have suggested that attributions by another
and attributions to oneself differ in both content and process. Their
major thesis is that, "... there is a persuasive tendency for actors
to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas ob-
servers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal disposi-
tions" (Jones and Nisbett, 1971, p. 2). They contend that for an
observer, "behavior is figural against the ground of the situation;"
while for the actor, "situational cues are figural" and behavior is
perceived as a response to the situation (Jones and Nisbett, 1971,
p. 15). While the question of freedom was not directly confronted,
this analysis and other research (e.g.. Feather and Simon, 1971; Jones
and Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1970; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Marecek,
1973; Storms, 1973) suggest that the attribution of freedom to oneself
may not parallel attributions of freedom by another.
As support for the proposition that the attributions by oneself
and another tend to diverge, Nisbett et_ al^. (1973) report several
studies which display the effect. However, they point out that the
mere accumulation of demonstrations of the phenomenon is of superficial
significance. What is necessary are studies which test the mechanisms
underlying the proposition. Storms (1973) presents data which strongly
suggest that the perceptual orientations are at least partially respon-
sible for the divergence in attributions by oneself and by an observer.
Storms arranged the experimental situation in such a way as to allow
both actors and observers to again view the actor's behavior from
either the same or a different visual orientation (this was accomplished
with the use of video tape recordings of the behavior). When actors
and observers viewed the behavior from the same orientations, he found
that actors attributed their behavior relatively more to situational
causes than did observers. But when a visual reorientation was in-
stituted, the attributional differences between actors and observers
were exactly reversed.^ Actors who viewed themselves attributed their
behaviors relatively less to situational causes than did observers.
While none of the previous research has specifically concerned
itself with the attribution of freedom, a study by Wolosin and
Denner
(1971) reports data which suggest that people do in fact attribute more
freedom to themselves than to others under similar conditions. Some of
the data from the Wolosin and Denner study suggest that the consequences
of the behavior (social desirability) have an influence on the attribu-
tion of freedom. The study investigated actions which could have been
perceived by the subjects as socially desirable in nature. The only
action which could be construed as socially undesirable ("running out"
on a person in trouble) did not result in the attribution of greater
freedom to self. Actually, it resulted in an increase in the freedom
being attributed to others. This ex post facto finding suggests that
the attribution of freedom to oneself (and/or another) may be sensitive
to evaluative factors in the situations, or may be used by the subject
for purposes of self-enhancement, dcfensiveness
,
justification, etc.
Bem (1965, 1967, 1968, 1972) has presented an analysis of the
attribution process which apparently contrasts with that of Jones and
Nisbett. Bem contends that the socialization process necessarily
teaches us to use overt cues as the basis for self-descriptive state-
ments. Thus, a person can be regarded as an observer of his own
behavior (especially when internal states are vague or ambiguous) , and
inferences (beliefs and attitude statements) are made from these
observations and the circumstantial context within which they occur.
Bem argues that self-perception and interpersonal perception are similar
with regard to process and with regard to certain sources of evidence
(i.e., overt behavior and its apparent controlling variables).
Research on the forced compliance situation by Calder, Ross and
Insko (1973) is one example of support for the Bem proposition. Their
5observers watched a participating subject perform a dull task and in-
sincere behavior. They found that the observer's estimates of the parti-
cipating subject's attitudes paralleled the participant's actual atti-
tudes to a "remarkable extent."
Bern (1972), however, identifies at least four factors which can
result in divergent perceptions by oneself and an observer:
(1) Internal stimuli; (2) knowledge of past behavior; (3) defensive-
ness, or self-esteem maintenance, and (4) perceptual differences for
actors and observers (as cited, for example, by Jones and Nisbett)
.
It was previously mentioned that the analysis by Jones and Nisbett
and the analysis by Bern were contrasting approaches to the attribution
process. However, it is possible to demonstrate that they differ sub-
stantially on only one point: Process. Other differences are only
ones of emphasis. If one were to eliminate from the Jones and Nisbett
analysis their contention that attributions by oneself and by an ob-
server involve different processes, the two positions would be amenable.
Actually, such an omission would not seriously jeopardize their contri-
bution for two reasons: (1) Their presentation and support for the
contention that there are two processes is extremely weak, and
(2) their conclusions are not contingent upon two processes being
different since all of their derivations can be supported by invoking
differential information, and by positing that different aspects of the
environment assume figure and ground roles for the actor and the
observer. •
Ignoring the question of process in the Jones and Nisbett analysis
allows it to assume a role which complements Bern's analysis. Specifically,
Bern states that we are observers of our own behavior, while Jones and
Nisbett suggest certain perceptual variables which may be relevant to
the manner in which we (as actors and as observers) make such observa-
tions. This compatibility between the two formulations, which occurs
because Bern predicts divergent attributions under certain conditions, is
especially evident in Bern's latest statement (Bern, 1972, p. 42).
Nisbett and Valins (1971) review some of the empirical evidence
for the self-perception process suggested by Bern and others (e.g.,
Schachter, 1962, 1964; Valins, 1966, 1973). Nisbett and Valins con-
clude that, "People appear to infer their beliefs and feelings from
observations both of their own overt behavior and their own autonomic
behavior" (p. 15). These authors also suggest that these inferences
take the form of hypotheses which the individual tries to confirm.
They contend that the causal origin of the behavior is crucial and
will, in part, determine the likelihood that an inference will be made
by the person.
Nisbett and Valins state that there are four elements which inter-
act and influence the inferences we make: (1) the behavior, (2) its
causes, (3) its consequences, and (4) feelings about the object toward
which the behavior was directed. Presumably these should also be
crucial variables in analyzing the attribution of freedom to oneself.
So far, the review of theoretical positions suggests that the
attribution of freedom to oneself will behave similarly to the attribu-
tion of freedom by another only under rather limited conditions.
Theoretically, if the sources of divergence identified by Bern were
minimized or eliminated, and if the four factors identified by Nisbett
7and Valins were, held constant, then attributions by oneself and by an
observer should be similar or equivalent. But, if these conditions are
not satisfied, it is possible that attributions to oneself and by an
observer will diverge, and the antecedant conditions for the attribution
of freedom by oneself will differ from those suggested by previous
research on the attribution of freedom by an observer. One aim of the
present research will be to evaluate how some of these parameters affect
the attribution of freedom by oneself and by an observer.
Hypotheses
Steiner defines perceived decision freedom as the, . . volition
the individual believes himself to exercise" (Steiner, 1971, p. 194).
Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) and Davidson and Steiner (1971)
have shown that predictability of behavior is crucial to the attribution
of decision freedom to another. Predictability has been successfully
manipulated by varying the frequency of reinforcements (Bringle,
Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and Steiner, 1971) and by varying
the magnitude of reinforcements (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner,
Experiment I, 1973). It is plausible that frequency of reinforcement
may have similar effects on the attribution of decision freedom to one-
self. That is, a person who observes himself behaving in a highly
predictable (consistent) manner is more likely to perceive himself as
constrained and, therefore, lacking decision freedom; whereas, a person
whose behavior varies considerably and is relatively unpredictable is
more likely to attribute decision freedom to himself.
Hypothesis 1 - Subjects who observe themselves emitting highly
consistent (i.e., 90% frequency, rewards and punishments of constant
magnitude) responses (High Consistency condition) will attribute less
decision freedom to themiselves than will subjects who observe themselves
emitting relatively inconsistent (i.e., 50% frequency of reinforcement,
rewards and punishments of varied magnitude) responses (Low Consistency
condition). An observer viewing the subject's behavior under either of
these conditions will make similar attributions to the subject. (See
Appendix I for the schedules of reinforcement.)
Actually, the above manipulation of consistency is, in essence,
a manipulation of consistency across occasions since the condition of
50% varied reinforcement (in contrast to the 90%, constant reinforcement)
represents variation in nature and frequency of the behavior on differ-
ent occasions. However, frequency and magnitude of reinforcement are
not the only ways to vary consistency across occasions. Steiner
(unpublished), working from Kelley's (1967) analysis of attribution,
has suggested that predictability may also depend upon what the individ-
ual reinforces as he moves from one occasion to another. Thus, for any
given frequency of reinforcement, if a person shows variations in what
he reinforces from one occasion to another, it is likely that (at least
initially) he will perceive himself (and be perceived by others) as
more free than a person who always reinforces the same entity on all
occasions.
Hypothesis 2 - Subjects who display highly predictable behavior in
the sense that they reward the presence of the same entity (entity A)
and punish its absence consistently across nearly all occasions (90%
A
condition) will attribute less decision freedom to themselves than
will
9subjects who obseirve themselves rewarding and punishing two different
entities (entities A and B) across occasions (A & B condition) . Sub-
jects who observe themselves initially endorsing one entity, and then
find themselves endorsing the other entity (B"*"A condition) will attribute
an intermediate amount of decision freedom to themselves. An observer
viewing the subject's behavior under these conditions should make sim-
ilar attributions to the subject.
Steiner (1971) has defined outcome freedom as including, "... the
availability and desirability of the outcomes a [person] wishes to
obtain" (p. 194). Whereas the perception of decision freedom is hypoth-
esized to be contingent upon the predictability of behaviors, outcome
freedom should vary as the frequency of the reinforcing behavior varies.
This assumes that subjects view the production of reinforcements as
desirable. It seems plausible that subjects will regard reinforcing
behavior as desirable because the experimenter V7ill have explained that
his purpose in conducting the experiment is to study such acts. Thus,
it appears that most of the normative factors operating in the experi-
mental situation will lead to the perception on the part of the subject
and observer that producing reinforcements is desirable.
Hypothesis 3 - Subjects who observe themselves emitting a high
frequency of reinforcements (High Consistency condition) will attribute
greater outcome freedom to themselves than will subjects who observe
themselves emitting relatively infrequent reinforcements (Low Consistency
condition). An observer viewing the subject's behavior under either of
these conditions will make similar attributions to the subject.
Research from the self perception framework (Schachter, Valins and
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Bern) suggests that people infer their beliefs from observations of their
own behavior. However, it also contends that such inferences are con-
tingent upon the person seeing himself as the causal origin of the
behavior. Thus, it follows that those subjects who see themselves as
being the cause of various patterns of reinforcements in the experiment
will assume that their behavior is indicative of their beliefs concern-
ing the experimental task.
Hypothesis 4 - Subjects who observe themselves almost always en-
dorsing a specific entity (90% A condition) will Indicate that that
entity is correct with greater certainty than will subjects who endorse
each of two entities with equal frequency, but with random ordering
(A & B condition). Those subjects who observe themselves endorsing an
entity initially, and then switch and begin endorsing the second entity
will assume an intermediate position with regard to their certainty as
to which entity is correct. Subjects who see themselves endorsing
positions with high frequency (High Consistency condition) will indicate
greater confidence with regard to which position they feel is correct
than will subjects who observe themselves endorsing positions with
relatively low frequency (Low Consistency condition). An observer
viewing the subject's behavior under these conditions should make
similar attributions to the subject.
Bern contends that attributions by oneself and by an observer will
be similar under the proper conditions. All of the above hypotheses
state that attributions by oneself and an observer will be similar since
the experimental situation will minimize or eliminate the effect of the
four factors mentioned by Bern (i.e., internal stimuli, knowledge of
11
past behavior, self-esteem maintenance, and perceptual differences),
and since the visual orientation to the behavior will be very similar
for the actor and the observer. However, it should be pointed out that
these predictions are in direct contrast to those made by Jones and
Nisbett. The latter authors are very explicit in their claim that a
person will attribute external causation to his own behavior, while an
observer will attribute internal causation to the same behavior. It
should be noted that the present experiment will provide a test of the
issue.
METHOD
One Viundred and eighty subjects reported in pairs to the laboratory
under the assumption that the experiment dealt with "learning and rein-
forcement." One of the subjects (selected randomly from the pair and
hereafter called participant) filled out a scale designed to measure
internal-external propensities (MacDonald and Tseng, unpublished). The
second subject (hereafter called observer) filled out the same scale
as he felt the participant would respond. (Every effort was made to
insure that the two subjects in an experimental session were not well
acquainted.
)
The initial phase of the experiment ostensibly conditioned a covert
thumb muscle response in each hand of the participant. The participant
was told (See Appendix II for complete instructions)
:
You will be exposed to an escape-avoidance task which will
be used to condition a thumb response in each of your hands.
You will wear a set of earphones through which will be played
music. In addition, a noise will occasionally interrupt the
music. You can turn off or delay the onset of the noise by
making the appropriate response.
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The appropriate response which the electromyograph will be
recording, and the only response, is a small muscle twitch which
is too small to be perceived by you. Please note that you can
not evoke the correct response by actively moving your thumbs
since this response is too big to register on the electrom^'ograph
and is filtered out.
During the conditioning, when the noise comes on, if a
small thumb twitch of the proper size occurs, the noise will be
turned off for the remainder of a five-second interval. Also,
if the noise is off and you make the thumb twitch, you v/ill post-
pone or avoid the onset of the noise for five seconds. In
addition, the appropriate response for the intervals will alternate
from left to right hand.
The subjects were seated in chairs facing the video monitor and
display board (See figure 1 for details of the room arrangement) while
the conditioning trials were administered. The bogus conditioning phase
lasted for 11 minutes during which time the participant and observer
heard through earphones the tape of music which was interrupted by
noise at a decreasing rate. Tlie participant vjas then given feedback
concerning the effectiveness of the conditioning: "The conditioning of
the two thumb responses is very strong and you have good control of the
responses in each of your hands." He was then told that the rest of
the experiment dealt with reinforcements and learning, and that the two
conditioned responses would be used in the rewarding and punishing
process.
The participant was told:
The subsequent part of the experiment investigates the
reinforcing behavior of individuals. You will be shown a video
tape of an experimental session filmed last semester. The tape
shows a person who is working on a perceptual discrimination
task which I will explain. The person was shown pairs of lines
which differed in length by a small amount; it was his task to
judge which of the two lines was the longer. As the experiment
progressed, the difference between the lengths of the lines slowly
became greater. The experimenter was interested in determining
at v;hich point the subject would be able to reliably determine
13
Figure 1
Layout of Experimental Laboratory
A. Table where pre- and post-experimental questionnaires were
administered.
B. Observer's seat during experimental session.
C. Participant's seat during experimental session (reclining chair).
D. Table containing video monitor and display panel.
E. Electrode leads and earphones.
F. One-way observation mirror.
G. Table containing video tape recorder, audio tape recorder,
timer and power supply.
H. Electromyograph.
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which line was the longer of the two. The experiment ended when
the subject was able to give six correct answers. The particular
subject whose performance you will be watching was able to com-
plete the experiment in just under the 50 trial average. You
are going to be shown, however, only a portion of those trials
—the first twenty trials.
Although the person was not given the following informa-
tion, we are going to tell you that the longer line was always
in the same position on the card. That is, the longer line v/as
always either on the left side or on the right side. Thus,
although you don't know at this time in which position the longer
line was, you do know it was always in the same position.
Following each response by the person on the tape, the
center light on this display panel will come on for 10 seconds.
Any thumb responses you produce during this 10 second period
will be recorded on the dials of the panel. The counters on the
panel will represent the total amount of reinforcements to the
person on the tape. Each response emitted by the right hand
will constitute a reward and will represent adding five cents
to the total. The rewards will be shown on the top counters. •
Any response emitted by the left hand will constitute a punish-
ment and will represent deducting five cents from the total. The
punishments will be shown on the bottom counters. The money
represented by your responses is symbolic and will represent
what you would have given the person for his performance had he
actually been doing the task as part of the present experiment.
The perceptual discrimination task consisted of pairs of lines
(with the left hand line labeled "A", and the right hand line labeled
"B") which varied in length and width from one card to another, but were
always of equal length and width on the same card. The accomplice
who assumed the role of subject on the video tape responded to the
stimuli in a random fashion such that 50% of his responses were "A"
and 50% "B". This manner of responding, and the fact that the person
on the tape was alleged to have taken just less than 50 trials before
he gave six correct answers, insured that the participant and observer
would have no basis for suspecting which of the two positions was
always correct.
Following the explanation of the procedure, the video tape of
15
experimental session was sho\m, and the reward and punishment responses
ostensibly produced by the participant were displayed after each trial.
The procedure of leading the participant to assume that the two covert
responses had been conditioned allowed one to display any distribution
of responses one wished, and, yet, have the subject assume that he had
emitted them. It also minimized the internal stimuli associated with
the participant's behavior and the prior experience associated with
the behavior. The responses that the participant would attribute to
himself could now be manipulated, and the antecedants and consequences
of the attributions that resulted from his observation of the behavior
which was ostensibly his could be investigated.
After viewing the video tape the participant was told that in order
to verify the amount of control that he had exercised over the responses,
and to check for improvement during the reinforcement phase, a short
session of escape-avoidance trials would be administered. On the four-
minute escape-avoidance tape the participant and observer again heard
music with some, but few, interruptions by noise. The participant was
then given verbal feedback indicating that he still had good control of
both responses.
A questionnaire was then administered to the participant which, in
addition to providing manipulation checks, measured the amount of
decision freedom and outcome freedom attributed by the participant to
himself and the nature of the constraints that he felt had influenced
his behavior. A questionnaire was administered to the observer on
which he reported his attributions to the participant on similar items.
(See Appendix III for questionnaires.)
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Manipulations
Each pair of subjects underwent one of two conditions designed to
manipulate predictability of the reinforcements by way of frequency of
reinforcements and magnitude of reinforcements. (In this experiment
either rewards or punishments might follow a trial, never both.) The
subjects were told that each reward and punishment represented five
cents. (See Appendix I for the schedules of reinforcement.)
(1) High Consistency condition - The counters indicated that the
participant rewarded 45% of the trials (9 trials) with six reward responses
each, and punished 45% of the trials (9 trials) with three punish respon-
ses each. This constitutes 90% reinforcement, with constant magnitude
of reward and punishment, and net reward of $1.35.
(2) Low Consistency condition - The counters indicated that the
participant rewarded 25% of the trials (5 trials) with 9, 9, 11, 12, and
13 reward responses each, and punished 25% of the trials (5 trials) with
4, 5, 5, 6, and 7 punish responses each. This constitutes 50% reinforce-
ment, with varied magnitude of reward and punishment, and a net reward
of $1.35.
Each pair of subjects also underwent one of three conditions de-
signed to manipulate predictability of reinforcements with regard to
consistency across occasions by way of the entity that was endorsed.
(1) 90% A condition - The reinforcements were distributed among
the trials in such a way as to Indicate that the participant was endors-
ing position "A" 90% of the time that he responded (50% of those times
were rewarding "A", and 50% were punishing "B") , and the responses
Indicated that he endorsed "B" the other 10% of the time.
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(2) B"^A condition - The reinforcements for the first ten trials
indicated that position "B" was endorsed 90% of the time that the parti-
cipant responded, while position "A" was endorsed 10% of the time that
he responded (in the 50%, B^A condition, position A was not endorsed).
During the next ten trials, the responses indicated that position "A"
was endorsed 90% of the time that he responded, and position "B" was
endorsed 10% of the time that he responded (in the 50%, B^ A condition,
position B was not endorsed)
.
(3) A & B condition - The reinforcements were distributed randomly
among the trials so that 50% of the times that the participant responded
he endorsed "A", and 50% of the times he endorsed "B".
Control Group
Traditional research in the attribution area has scored "attributions"
in terms of the absolute magnitude of the post-informational beliefs or
attitudes (e.g., Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones and Harris, 1967).
Ajzen (1971) has argued that there are compelling methodological and
theoretical reasons for treating attributions as, "... an estimate of
change in attributed disposition (e.g., attitude) that results from
information about an actor's behavior" (Ajzen, 1971, p. 145). Thus,
the strength of an attribution would be reflected in the amount of
change produced by new information.
In light of this position, a Control Group was employed in the
design from which difference or change scores were generated. Subjects
in this group participated in the experimental procedures as normal
subjects except that they were told that while their reinforcement
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responses would be recorded by the experimenter, they would not be dis-
played. Thus, subjects in the Control Group hear the sarae "conditioning"
tape, saw the same video tape of the perceptual discrimination task, and
then heard the same "check" tape. The only difference between the Con-
trol Group and the experimental groups was that the Control Group sub-
jects had no feedback concerning the nature of the participant's rein-
forcement responses. There were fifteen pairs of subjects in the Control
Group.
RESULTS
For purposes of analysis, each pair of subjects was treated as
the experimental unit. Thus, Consistency and Entity were tested as
"between pair" factors, while Role (Participant-Observer) was treated
as a "within pair" factor. An analysis of variance on the three factors
(fifteen pairs per cell) was performed on experimental subjects' re-
sponses to each item of the questionnaire. These scores will be re-
ferred to as "absolute" scores since they "represent the absolute or
final position of the subject's attitude or belief following observa-
tion of the participant's reinforcing behavior.
Because an attribution can be conceptualized as a change of
inferred attitude or belief following the observation of some event,
difference scores were also obtained. The Control Group, consisting of
thirty subjects who were exposed to the entire experimental procedure
except that the participant's "reinforcement responses" were not dis-
played, was included in the design to provide a baseline against which
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to evaluate the impact of information concerning the experimental parti-
cipant's reinforcing behaviors.
For each questionnaire item, the mean response of the Control
Group subjects who served as participant (but who received no feedback
concerning reinforcement responses) was subtracted from the response of
the experimental participant (who did receive feedback concerning rein-
forcement responses) . The same procedure was used to generate difference
scores for subjects who served as observers in the experimental condi-
tions. Thus, the Control Group scores represent the subjects' impressions
that result from having gone through the experimental procedure without
being informed as to the nature of the participant's reinforcing behavior.
The absolute score represents impressions that result from having gone
through the experimental procedure an d having observed the participant's
reinforcing behavior. The difference score represents the effect of
the displayed reinforcing behaviors on the impressions of the subjects.
Thus, it is possible for the significance of the Role variable to fluct-
uate depending upon whether one is concerned with Control Group scores,
absolute scores, or difference scores. For example, experimental parti-
cipants and observers might differ greatly on some attribute when ab-
solute scores are examined, but Control Group participants and observers
might have very similar scores on that attribute which fall on the
scale in a position somewhere between the two absolute scores. In
such a case, experimental participants and observers would have very
dissimilar difference scores, indicating that they have been unequally
affected by knowledge of the participant's reinforcing behaviors.
20
An analysis of variance disclosed significant differences between
the responses of Control Group participants and observers on only the
following items:
The observer thought that the participant's reinforcements would
be significantly (Y-^ 28 ~ ^-SS, p < .05) more "predictable"
(Mean = 6.53) than did the participant (Mean = 4.53).
The observer thought that the participant's reinforcements would
be significantly (Fi,28 = A. 38, p < .05) more "helpful" (Mean=
5.67) than did the participant (Mean = 4.47).
The participant thought that his reinforcements were significantly
(Ti 28 ~ 7.9, p < .05) more determined by the answers given on
the tape (Mean = 7.53) than did the observer (Mean = 5.6).
All other tests for differences between the responses of Control Group
participants and observers were nonsignificant.
Manipulation Checks
Subjects were asked to characterize the participant's reinforcing
behavior on a number of graphic rating scales. (See Appendix III for
questionnaire items.) Two items, Consistent-Inconsistent and Predict-
able-Unpredictable, were included as checks on the Consistency manipula-
tion. The analysis of variance of the absolute and the difference
- scores indicated a significant (p < .05) main effect due to Consistency
of reinforcements for both items. Table 1 reports the means, F-values,
and significance levels for these effects.
These findings support the assumption that a 90%, constant magni-
tude reinforcement schedule would be regarded as more consistent and
more predictable than a 50%, varied-magnitude reinforcement schedule.
The main effect of the Consistency manipulation for the difference
scores indicates that subjects "revised" their impression much more
after being exposed to the Low Consistency condition (Mean = -1.45,
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Table 1
Means for Rated Consistency and Predictability
for Each Consistency Level
Absolute Scores
Consistent- Predictable-
Inconsistent Unpredictable
High
Consistency 5.6 5.2
Low
Consistency A.
5
4.3
F-values
^1,84 = '-''^
p < .05 p < .05
Difference Scores
Consistent- Predictable-
Inconsistent Unpredictable
High
-.35Consistency -.4
Low
Consistency -1.46 -1.21
F-values
^,84
=
p < .01 p < .05
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negative number indicates a change toward the "Very Inconsistent" end
of the scale) than they did after being exposed to the High Consistency
condition (Mean = -.AO). Thus, both reinforcement schedules were less
consistent than expected, and the change toward perceived inconsistency
in the Low Consistency condition was much greater than in the High
Consistency condition. The means for the Predictable-Unpredictable
item add further support for the manipulation's effectiveness. Tlie
Low Consistency condition was much less predictable than expected, and
subjects who received that condition "revised" their judgments to a
much greater degree than did subjects who received the High Consistency
condition.
As another check on the Consistency manipulation, subjects were
asked to estimate the percentage of trials on which the participant
1) rewarded, 2) punished, 3) neither rewarded nor punished, and A) both
rewarded and punished. (The last category did not actually occur;
however, it was included on the questionnaire because the participant
was ostensibly producing the displayed responses and they could have
been of any nature.) The analysis of variance indicates a significant
(p < .05) main effect due to Consistency of reinforcements on the first
three estimates for both the absolute and difference scores. The
means are reported in Table 2. Both sets of analyses support the
assumption that, at least on the frequency of reinforcement dimension,
the manipulation was effective in varying perceived consistency.
As a check on the Entity manipulation, subjects were asked to
estimate the percentage of trials on which the participant endorsed
position A on the video tape, endorsed position B, or endorsed neither.
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Table 2
Means for Estimated Percentage
of Reinforcements for Each Con-
sistency Level
Absolute Scores
% Rewarded % Punished % Neither
Rewarded
Nor Punished
High
Consistency 56.9 31.2 9.6
Low
Consistency 44.7 22.4 32.1
F-values
^1,84
=
p < .01
F = 45.
1,84
p < .01 p < .01
Difference Scores
% Rewarded % Punished % Neither
Rewarded
Nor Punished
High
-5.8Consistency 12.6 7.7
Low
Consistency .4 -16.5 16.7
F-values
^.84
=
p < .01 p < .01 p < .01
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The analysis of variance of the absolute scores indicated a significant
main effect due to the Entity manipulation on the estimate of the number
of trials the participant endorsed position A. For the difference
scores, a significant main effect due to Entity was also found on the
estimated percentage of trials that position A had been endorsed, but
not on the other two estimates. A simple effects test performed on
the Entity main effect indicates a significant difference between the
90% A and the B->A conditions (Newman-Keuls critical value for both
absolute and difference scores = 11.4, p < .05), while the other com-
parisons were not significant. These data suggest that, at least for
this index, the manipulation of consistency with regard to what the
participant reinforced did not have the expected effect. These find-
ings also suggest that any effects hypothesized to be the result of the
Entity manipulation are in jeopardy.
There was a significant main effect (p < .05) due to Consistency
on all three measures regarding what was reinforced for both the
absolute and difference scores. These means are also reported in
Table 3. The fact that the Consistency main effect was found significant
adds further support for the assumption that the Consistency manipula-
tion had the desired effect.
Characterization of the Reinforcements
The first set of questionnaire items dealt with how subjects char-
acterized the participant's reinforcing behavior on a number of dimen-
sions (See Appendix III for the questionnaire items). In addition to
the findings already reported as manipulation checks, there was a
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Table 3
Means for Estimated Percentage of Endorsements
Absolute Scores
% Endorsed % Endorsed % Endorsed
Position A Position B Neither
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
49.5 39.1 13.8
36.1 31.8 31.0
p < .01
F = 5.5
1,84
p < .05
F = 27.9
1,84
p < .01
% Endorsed
Position A
90% A
B-)- A
A & B
F-value
Difference Scores
% Endorsed % Endorsed % Endorsed
Position A Position B Neither
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
F-values
50.6
35.7
41.8
^2,84
-
p < .05
11.7 -.58 -5.6
-1.2 -7.9 11.5
F o/ = 22.1,84
p < .01
F = 5.5
1,84
p < .05 p < .01
Table 3
(Continued)
Difference Scores
90% A
B-»- A
A & B
F-value
% Endorsed
Position A
12.
A
-1.6
4.5
^2,84
=
p < .05
significant main effect for Role on difference scores dealing with
judged consistency and predictability. The means for these effects are
reported in Table 4. They indicate that the observer "revised" his
inference about the consistency of the participant's reinforcing behavio
more than did the participant, while each perceived the reinforcing
behavior as less consistent than expected. Also, the amount of change
the observer underwent in the "unpredictable" direction (Mean = -1.A6)
was significantly different from the amount of change the participant
underwent in the "predictable" direction (Mean = .103). As reported
earlier, it should be noted that within the Control Group, the observer
thought that the participant's behavior would be significantly more
predictable than did the participant.
An analysis of how Helpful-Unhelpful the reinforcing behavior had
been perceived to be indicated significant Consistency and Entity
main effects for both absolute and difference scores, and a significant
Role main effect for the difference scores. Table 5 reports the means
for these effects. For the Consistency main effect, the means for the
absolute scores indicate that the High Consistency condition was per-
ceived as more helpful than the Low Consistency condition. For the
difference scores, they indicate that the High Consistency condition
was perceived as more helpful, while the Low Consistency condition
was perceived as less helpful, the difference between the two being
significant. For the Role main effect, the significant difference was
the result of participants perceiving their behavior as more helpful
than expected, while the observers perceived it as less helpful than
expected. Within the Control Group, observers had thought the
28
Table A
Mean of Participant and Observer
Ratings of Predictability and Consistency
Difference Scores
Predictable- Consistent-
Unpredictable Inconsistent
Participant + .10 -.43
Observer -1.66 -1.43
F-values
^,84
=
p < .01 p < .05
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Table 5
Mean for Ratings of Helpfulness,
Fairness and Desirability
Helpful-Unhelpful
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
High
Consistency 5.5 .44
Low
Consistency A.
8
-.25
F-values
^1,84 = ''^
p < .05
^,84
=
p < .05
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
90% A A. 85 -.22
B-*- A 4.95 -.12
A & B 5.7 + .63
F-value
p < .05
F = 4.9
^2,84
p < .05
Participant
Observer
F-value
Difference
Scores
.46
-.27
^1,84 = ''^^
p < .05
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Fair-Unfair
90% A
B-*- A
A & B
F-value
Participant
Observer
F-values
Desirable-Undesirable
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
F-values
Table 5
(Continued)
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
5.8
.3
4.9
-.6
5.5
.04
p < .05
2,84
p < .05
Difference
.41
-.58
^1,84
=
p < .01
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
5.7 .16
5.2 -.37
F =4.1
p < .05 p < .05
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Table 5
(Continued)
Desirable-Undesirable
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
90% A 5.3 -.28
B-> A 5.0 -.50
A & B 5.9 .45
F-values
^2,84 = ''^
p < .05
^,84
=
p < .05
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participant's behavior was significantly more helpful than did the
participants.
The analysis of how Fair-Unfair the participant's reinforcing
behavior had been indicated a significant Role main effect for dif-
ference scores and an Entity main effect for both the absolute and the
difference scores. The means for these effects are reported in Table 5.
For the absolute scores, the participant perceived the behavior as less
fair than did the observer. However, analysis of the difference scores
indicated that the participant's "revision" toward the "Fair" end of
the scale differed significantly from the observer's "revision" toward
the "Unfair" end of the scale.
The analysis of how Desirable-Undesirable the reinforcements had
been yielded a significant Consistency main effect and a significant
Entity main effect for both the absolute and difference scores. The
means for these effects are reported in Table 5. With regard to the
absolute scores, the High Consistency condition was perceived as more
desirable than the Low Consistency condition. Furthermore, the differ-
ence scores revealed that the "revision" for the High Consistency con-
dition was in the "desirable" direction while the "revision" for the
Low Consistency condition was in the "undesirable" direction, and the
difference between the two conditions was significant.
Decision Freedom
Four items were designed to measure the amount of perceived
2
decision freedom. The following two items yielded similar results:
How free did the [participant] feel to decide, on each particular
trial, to reward the [subject] in the video tape for an answer
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he had previously punished? (All wording for items is taken
from the observer's questionnaire.) How free did the
[participant] feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
punish the [subject] in the video tape for an answer he had
previously rewarded?
The analysis of variance indicated a significant Consistency X
Role interaction on both items, for both the absolute and the difference
scores. The means for this effect are reported in Table 6. For both
items, analysis of the absolute scores using the Newman-Keuls simple
effects test also indicated that the participant attributed less freedom
to himself than did the observer when in the High Consistency condition
(Critical value = 1.35, p < .05). For the first item only, the simple
effects test also indicated that the participant attributed less decision
freedom to himself in the High Consistency condition than in the Low
Consistency condition. For the difference scores this last finding was
again found to be significant. The means indicate that for the partici-
pant, the "revision" toward less freedom in the High Consistency condi-
tion was significantly different from the "revision" toward greater
freedom in the Low Consistency condition (Critical value = 1.A8,
p <.05). The simple effects test also indicated a significant dif-
ference between the participant and the observer in the Low Consistency
condition (Critical value = 1.35, p< .05).
Another perceived decision freedom item asked, "How free did the
[participant] feel to decide, on each particular trial, that the
[subject] in the video, tape deserved neither reward nor punishment?"
There was a significant main effect due to Consistency (F^^sA ^
p <.05) on the absolute scores, and a significant main effect due to
Consistency (F, ^, - 5.53, p <.05) on the difference scores. These
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Table 6
Means for Rated Decision Freedom Items
How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
to reward the subject for an answer he had previously punished?
Absolute Difference
Scores Scores
Participant
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
Observer
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
F-values
3.9 -.9
5.6 +.9
5.3 .00
4.6 -.7
F =14.4
1,84
p < .01
^1,84
=
p < .01
How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
to punish the subject for an answer he previously rewarded?
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
Participant
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
Observer
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
F-values
4.2 .0
4.9 .7
5.1 .0
4.5 -.6
^,84 = '-'^
p < . 05
^1.84 = ^•°>
p < .05
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Table 6
(Continued)
How free did the participant feel to decide, on each particular trial,
that the subject deserved neither reward nor punishment?
Absolute Difference
Scores Scores
High
Consistency 4.6 -.3
Low Consistency 5.5 +.6
F-value
^1,84 = '-'^ ^1,84 = 5-5'
p < .05 p < .05
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means are reported in Table 6. For the absolute scores, they indicate
that greater decision freedom was attributed in the Low Consistency
condition than in the High Consistency condition. The difference
scores indicate that both the participant and observer "revised" their
judgments toward the "Very Free" direction in the Low Consistency con-
dition, while they "revised" their judgments in the "Very Unfree"
direction in the High Consistency condition.
The following item was also designed to measure perceived decision
freedom: "On each particular trial, how free did the [participant] feel
* to change his mind about which answer should be rewarded and which should
be punished?" There were no significant effects for this item.
Thus, the four items used to assess attributed decision freedom
provide somewhat inconsistent support for the hypothesis that High Con-
sistency leads to the attribution of less decision freedom than does
Low Consistency. The data indicate that this tendency is more pro-
nounced for the participant than for the observer.
Outcome Freedom
The following three items were designed to evaluate the amount of
outcome freedom attributed to the participant by the participant and
the observer:
How free was the [participant] to give rewards and punishments
to the [subject] in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
How free was the [participant] to withhold rewards and punish-
ments from the [subject] in the video tape when he wanted
to do so?
In general, how free was the [participant] to reinforce the
[subject] the way he wanted to?
The correlations among these items are .59 (first and second items),
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.89 (first and third items), and .65 (second and third items) (p< .01).
These three items were summed to give a composite outcome freedom
score. The analysis of the absolute composite score indicated a sig-
nificant Role main effect while the analysis of the composite dif-
ference score indicated a marginally significant (p < .08) Role main
effect. An examination of the absolute means (reported in Table 7)
indicates that the observer attributed more outcome freedom to the
participant than did the participant himself. The means of the dif-
ference scores reveal that the participant's "revision" toward the
\ "Unfree" end of the scale was greater than the observer's. Thus, there
is no support for the hypothesis that the High Consistency condition
would lead to the attribution of greater outcome freedom than would the
Low Consistency condition.
Correct Position in the Perceptual Discrimination Task
Subjects were asked to indicate, on a nine-step bi-polar scale,
their degree of certainty that position A or position B on the video
tape was the correct position. The analysis of variance indicated a
significant Entity X Role interaction for both absolute and difference
scores, as well as significant Role and Entity main effects for the
absolute scores. The means for these effects are reported in Table 8.
A simple effects test on the Entity main effect for the absolute scores
indicated that subjects were significantly more certain that A was
the correct position in the 90% A condition than in either the B ->A
condition or the A & B condition. This is partial support for the
hypothesis that what one reinforces is construed as an indication of
what one believes is correct.
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Table 7
Means of Composite Outcome
Freedom Score
Absolute Difference
Scores Scores
Participant
Observer
F-value
12.62
-4.9
15.27 -3.2
p < .05 p < .08
Table 8
Participant
Observer
F-value
Absolute Scores
90% A
B -^A
A & B
F-value
Difference Scores
90% A
B ->A
A & B
Mean Certainty Ratings of
Correct Position
Absolute Absolute
Scores Scores
5.9
A.
9
4.9
F
2,84
3.3, p < 05
Participant Observer
5.8 6.0
3.8 5.9
5.0 4.8
F2^g^ = 4.95, p<.05
Participant Observer
1.0 0.7
-.8 0.6
0.4 -.6
90% A
B->- A
A & B
F-value
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The means for the Role main effect in the absolute data demon-
strated that observers were more certain about which position they
thought the participant believed to be correct than were the parti-
cipants. An analysis of the interaction for the absolute scores in-
dicates that the participant and the observer differed significantly
in their beliefs concerning the correct position only in B^A condition
(Newman-Keuls critical value = 1.59, p < .05).
Control Responses
The following two items were used to evaluate the amount of con-
trol the participant believed he exercised over his reinforcing
behavior:
How much control do you think the [participant] believed he
possessed over the conditioned thumb responses?
How much control did the [participant] feel he exercised over
the amount of money he gave during the reinforcement session?
The inter-item correlation was .77 (p < .01). The two items were
summed and an analysis of variance for the composite control score
indicated a significant main effect due to Role (F, = 16.71, p < .01)lyO^
j
for the absolute scores, but there were no significant effects in the i
j
analysis of the difference scores. The means are reported in Table 9.
The means for the absolute data indicate that the observer felt that
the participant possessed much greater control over the conditioned
responses and the money given than did the participant.
It was thought that subjects may have felt that while the partici-
pant demonstrated good control during the conditioning phase of the
experiment and during the check on the control that followed the
reinforcement phase of the experiment, his control may not have been
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Table 9
Means for Rated and Derived Control
Scores
Composite Control Score
Participant
Observer
F-value
Absolute
Scores
Scores for Discrepancy Between Control in Conditioning and Reinforcement
Phases of Experiment
Absolute Difference
Scores Scores
Participant .86 .93
Observer .18 .17
F-values
^,84
=
p< .05 p< .05
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
High
Consistency .22 .26
Low
Consistency .81 .87
F-values
^1.84
=
p <.05 p <.05
Table 9
(Continued)
Absolute Scores for Discrepancy Index
High
Participant Observer
Consistency .31 .13
Low
Consistency 1.4 .22
F-value
^1 84 " P <-056
Difference Scores for Discrepancy Index
Participant Observer
High
Consistency .38 .13
Low
Consistency 1.47 .22
F-value F^ = 3.82, p< .056
A3
very good during the reinforcement phase. To evaluate any such tendency,
a difference score between "general control" and "control over reinforce-
ments" was obtained for both the participant and the observer. An
analysis of variance for the absolute scores and the difference scores
indicated a significant main effect for Consistency and Role (p < .05),
and a marginally significant Role X Consistency interaction (p < .056).
The means for the absolute and difference scores (reported in Table 9)
indicate that subjects reported greater discrepancy
. between general
control and reinforcement control in the Low Consistency condition than
in the High Consistency condition. The means for the Role main effect
show that the participant reported a greater discrepancy than did the
observer.
The means for the marginally significant Role X Consistency inter-
action are also reported in Table 9. A simple effects test indicates
that for both the absolute and the difference scores the discrepancy
in control for the participant in the Low Consistency condition was
significantly greater than the amount of discrepancy reported in the
other three cells (Newman-Keuls critical value for the ordered
differences are: 1.163, 1.06, .882, p <.05).
Perceived Constraints
Subjects responded to the item, "To what degree were the rewards
and punishments the [participant] gave determined by the answers given
by the [subject] in the video tape?" A Consistency X Entity X Role
interaction was significant in the analysis of both absolute and dif-
ference scores. There was also a marginally significant (p < .065)
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Role main effect in the absolute analysis, while the Role main effect
was highly significant (p < .01) for the difference scores. Inspec-
tion of the second-order interaction did not suggest any psychologically
significant implications. The means for the Role main effect are re-
ported in Table 10. For the absolute scores, the means indicate that
the observer rated the participant's reinforcements as being more com-
pletely determined by the subject's answers than did the participant.
For the difference scores (as reported earlier, the participant and
observer differed on this item in the Control Group, with the partici-
pant anticipating that the responses would be more determined by the
subject's answers than did the observer) there was greater "revision"
by the participant than by the observer, while both moved toward the
"Completely Undetermined" end of the scale.
Analysis of difference scores indicated a significant Role main
effect on responses to the item, "To what degree did the [participant]
feel that it was unnecessary to punish the [subject] every time he gave
an answer he believed to be incorrect?" With a significant difference
in the amounts of "revision" by the two roles, the participant showed
"revision" toward the "Completely Necessary" end of the scale (Mean =
.54), while the observer underwent "revision" toward the "Completely
Unnecessary" end (Mean = -.74). Analysis of the absolute scores
indicated no significant effects on responses to this item.
For the item, "To. what degree did the [participant] feel that it
was unnecessary to reward the participant every time he gave an answer
which the [subject] in the video tape believed to be correct?", there
was a significant Role main effect for the difference scores, but no
Table 10
Means for Perceived Constraint
Item
Absolute Difference
Scores Scores
Participant
Observer
F-values
4.75 -2.77
5.40 -.16
^1,84
=
p< .065
^,84
=
P< .01
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significant effects for the absolute scores. The means indicate that
the participant's reinforcing behavior evoked significantly greater
"revision" by the participant (Mean = -1.76) than by the observer
(Mean =
-.90), with both moving toward the "Completely Unnecessary"
end of the scale.
Analysis of absolute and difference scores revealed no significant
effects on any of the following:
How relaxed was the [participant] during the reinforcement
session?
How important in determining the [participant's] behavior was
his belief that one of the positions was correct?
How important in determining the [participant's] behavior
was his estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrim-
ination task?
The MacDonald and Tseng Internal-External scale.
The multiple-choice "causation" item (McArthur, 1972).
Four items yielded significant Role main effects when analyzed on
the basis of absolute scores, but no significant effects when analyzed
in terms of difference scores. The means for these items are reported
in Table 11. The means indicate that the observer attached greater
importance than did the participant to control of the thumb responses
and to the participant's own generosity and stinginess, while the
participant attached greater importance than did the observer to the
belief that the observer would want the participant to reward and
punish in a certain way, and to the influence of the participant's
thought processes on the reinforcements. (All effects were significant
at at least the p < .05 level except the last variable which was
significant at the p < .07 level.)
Subjects were asked to estimate the importance of the participant's
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Table 11
Means for Perceived Constraints
Importance of Control of Reinforcements
Absolute
Scores
Participant
Observer
F-value
Importance of Participant's Own Generosity and Stinginess
Absolute
Scores
Participant
Observer
F-value
Importance of Belief that the Observer Would Want the Participant To
Reward In a Certain Way
Absolute
Scores
Participant
Observer
F-value
Table 11
(Continued)
How Much Influence Did the Participant's Thought Process Have On
the Reinforcements?
Absolute
Scores
Participant
Observer
F-value
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
F-value
5.8
5.1
p < .07
Fair Play
Absolute
Scores
Difference
Scores
5.6 -.1
4.7 -.6
^,84=^-^> •
p< .05
^,84 = '-'^
p< .05
Cause of Reinforcing Behavior Internal or External?
Difference
Scores
Participant
Obseirver
F-value
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belief, "that equity and fair play demand that people get what they
deserve," as a determinant of his reinforcing behavior. The analysis
of the absolute and difference scores indicated a significant Con-
sistency main effect. The means for the effects are reported in Table 11.
For the absolute scores, the means suggest that the High Consistency
condition resulted in greater attributed importance than did the Low
Consistency condition. The difference scores show, however, that the
Low Consistency condition resulted in greater reduction in attributed
importance than did the High Consistency condition.
Subjects were asked to estimate whether they felt that the locus
of causation for the reinforcing behavior was internal or external.
Analysis of the absolute scores indicated no significant effects, while
the analysis of the difference scores revealed a significant main effect
due to Role. The means, reported in Table 11, indicate that while both
the participant and observer "revised" their estimates in the internal
direction, the participant's "revision" was greater.
For the item, "How hard did the participant try to reward the
correct response and punish the incorrect response?", analysis of the
absolute scores revealed a significant Consistency X Entity interaction
(p < .01). The means are reported in Table 12. Simple effects test
indicated that the High Consistency, A & B condition differed signi-
ficantly from all other conditions. In addition, the High Consistency
condition and the Low Consistency condition differed significantly from
each other under the B-> A condition.
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Table 12
Means of Effort Item
Absolute Scores
High
Consistency
Low
Consistency
90% A 6.25 6.50
B->-
A
7.0 . 5.21
A & B 4.A6 6.67
F-value F „ = 10.21, p <.01
2,84
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DISCUSSION
The hypotheses that guided this research dealt with the impact of
behavioral consistency on observers' and participants' attributions of
freedom. Consistency was defined in terms of (a) the frequency, and
constancy of magnitude, of reinforcing behaviors and (b) the constancy
of the entity that was reinforced. Both attributed decision freedom
and attributed outcome freedom were examined, and it was predicted that
manipulated consistency would have similar or identical effects on the
attributions of observers and participants.
The data provided little evidence that behavioral consistency
affected attributed freedom, but abundant evidence that it affected
subjects' evaluations of observed behaviors, and their attributions to
the participants who produced them. Furthermore, manipulated consistency
sometimes had markedly different effects on observers and participants.
After discussing possible reasons why attributed freedom was compara-
tively unaffected by manipulated consistency, attention will be focused
on the many observer vs . participant differences that are revealed by
the data.
Hypothesis One contended that both observers and participants
would attribute less decision freedom to the participant when his rein-
forcing behavior was consistent than when it was inconsistent. Four
questionnaire items were employed to assess attributed decision freedom.
Participants' responses to two of these items supported the hypothesis,
whereas observers' responses to only one item did so. By comparison
with the results of earlier research that had tested this hypothesis on
observers only (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and
Steiner, 1971) the present findings are rather weak.
The second hypothesis predicted that both participants and
observers would attribute less decision freedom when the participant
almost invariably reinforced one entity than when he sometimes rein-
forced Entity A and sometimes Entity B. Two "alternating" schedules
were employed: in one case the participant reinforced Entity B during
the first 10 trials and then switched to Entity A for the last ten
trials, whereas in the other case the participant distributed his rein-
forcements in a somewhat random fashion. Unfortunately, these mani-
pulations did not have the intended effects on subjects' perceptions.
A manipulation check indicated that, although a pattern of reinforce-
ments that endorsed Entity A 90% of the time was seen to differ from
one that switched from Entity B to Entity A midway through the trials,
neither of them was judged to be significantly different from the
"random" pattern. There were no significant effects to the Entity
manipulation on attributed decision freedom.
Hypothesis Three predicted that both observers and participants
would attribute greater outcome freedom to the participant when his
reinforcing behaviors were consistent than when they were inconsistent.
Three questionnaire items were employed to assess outcome freedom
(freedom of the participant to accomplish his desired end) . Inter-
item correlations were high, and the three items were combined to
yield a composite score. No significant effects of behavioral con-
sistency on attributed outcome freedom were obtained. However,
observers attributed significantly greater outcome freedom than did
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participants.
Hypothesis Four contended that both observers and participants
who observed reinforcing behavior that consistently endorsed or
supported Entity A rather than Entity B would conclude that the parti-
cipant personally regarded Entity A as the correct or preferred one.
As noted earlier, the Entity manipulation had the intended perceptual
effects only for the condition in which Entity A was consistently
endorsed and the condition in which Entity B was endorsed during the
first half of the trials and Entity A was endorsed during the last half
of the trials. Consistent with Hypothesis Four, these two conditions
yielded significantly different estimates of the participant's certainty
that Entity A was the correct one. In addition to the main effect of
these two conditions, observers were significantly more confident than
were participants that the participant believed Entity A to be the
correct alternative.
Failure to confirm Hypothesis Two can be explained as a consequence
of the weak or ineffective manipulation of the Entity variable. But
faulty manipulations do not account for the rather inconsistent support
of Hypothesis One or the total absence of support for Hypothesis Three.
In fact, the effect of the Consistency manipulation closely paralleled
its effect in previous research (Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973).
It was successful in varying the perceived consistency, predictability,
and frequency of reinforcements. In addition, the High Consistency
condition was perceived as more helpful, more desirable, more likely
to involve an attempt to please the experimenter, and as reflecting
equity and fair play considerations to a greater extent. These
findings
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support the assumption made in this research and previous research
(Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner, 1973; Davidson and Steiner, 1971) that
subjects believe highly consistent behavior to be a consequence of
normative considerations, social expectations, and social desirability.
Since the Consistency manipulations had many of the same effects
noted in earlier studies, failure to obtain strong support for two of
the hypotheses would appear to reflect other features of the present
study. The conditions created by the present experiment were quite
different from those under which Hypothesis One had been strongly
supported for observers in the past. In the research by Davidson and
Steiner (1971) and Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) there was little
room for an observer to question the participant's freedom to do what-
ever he decided to do. Once the participant decided to reward or not
to reward a particular act, he could readily provide or withhold the
monetary reinforcements at his disposal. Furthermore, the merits of
the acts that justified reward or punishment were clear to the ob-
server: He knew which acts were "correct" and which were not. Under
these circumstances the only uncertainty pertained to the participant's
freedom to decide for himself whether and when to administer rewards
and punishments.
In the present study three critical elements of the situation
were unclear to the subjects. First, although a strong attempt was
made to convince participants and observers that the formers' thumbs
had been adequately conditioned, neither kind of subject may have been
very thoroughly convinced that the participant could deliver the
rewards and punishments he wished to deliver. In response to
questionnaire
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items observers rated the participant's control of his reinforcing
behaviors at only about the midpoint of the graphic scale, and the
participants themselves were even more dubious of their control. The
same low level of conviction was revealed by responses to outcome
freedom items.
Secondly, in the present study neither observers nor participants
could feel very certain of the quality of the acts that were observed.
It is to be recalled that the two lines (Entities A and B) were iden-
tical, so subjects had no real basis for concluding that the choice of
one was more commendable or correct than the choice of the other.
Thirdly, in previous studies subjects were instructed to "reinforce
as you think appropriate." However, in the present research, the ex-
perimenter endeavored to create a very different mental set. He
asked the participant to sit back, relax, and watch the video tape,
since the experimenter was only interested in observing how the thumb
responses reacted when they represented reinforcements. References to
the idea that the participant was to reinforce as he thought appropriate
were avoided entirely, and corrected if mentioned by either subject,
since they would have made the predictions of Hypothesis Four trivial.
However, it was assumed that subjects might still infer that the parti-
cipant was doing what he wanted to do.
These uncertainties permitted participants and observers to inter-
pret the participant's behaviors in more than one way. For instance,
an inconsistent participant could be perceived as changing his opinion
as to whether line A or line B was the correct one. Alternatively,
perhaps. his opinion was constant but he was trying out various
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reinforcement strategies. Or, perhaps his opinion was not changing,
but his ability to deliver intended reinforcements was faulty. Simi-
larly, a consistent, participant might be seen as one who was unable or
unwilling to deliver a complex pattern of reinforcements. Thus, incon-
sistent reinforcing behavior could be interpreted as indicating either
the presence of decision freedom (freedom to change one's mind about
which entity should be reinforced or how reinforcement should be given)
or the absence of outcome freedom (freedom to deliver the reinforce-
ments one wishes to deliver) . Consistent reinforcing behavior could
be interpreted to imply an absence of decision freedom or an absence of
outcome freedom (in this case, freedom to deliver reinforcements in a
way that would result in inconsistency)
.
It appears reasonable to suggest that the consistency of a rein-
forcing agent's behaviors provides evidence concerning his decision
freedom only when he is believed to possess considerable outcome
freedom (freedom to do what he decides to do). Conversely, the con-
sistency of his behavior constitutes strong evidence concerning his out-
come freedom only when there is reason to believe he prefers and
intends to pursue one course of action rather than another. (Otherwise
it is unclear whether the consistency/inconsistency of his actions
reflects his freely chosen strategy or his inability to produce the
behaviors required by his chosen strategy.
When viewed in this light, the data relevant to Hypotheses One
and Three seem reasonable enough. The consistency of the participant's
behaviors did not have strong effects on the attribution of decision
freedom, because neither participants nor observers believed he had very
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much outcome freedom. And consistency did not have much effect on the
attribution of outcome freedom because the entities which were to be
selectively reinforced were identical and, therefore, provided no basis
for real preference. Perhaps this interpretation is more applicable
to observers than to participants because the latter presumably knew
that they sometimes intended to reinforce one entity rather than the
other. Such knowledge of intentions, available only to the participant,
would explain why the participant felt he had less control than the
observer thought he had, and his tendency to report a greater discrep-
ancy between general control of responses and control during the rein-
forcement phase.
Correlations reported in Table 13 support this line of reasoning.
The correlations indicate that outcome freedom and control were signifi-
cantly (p < .01) related. Thus, only when the subjects assumed that
the participant had control of the thumb responses did they assume that
he was able to produce the responses he desired. The correlations
indicate that both attributed control and outcome freedom were posi-
tively related to the inferred effect of thought processes on the
conditioned thiunb responses, and the degree that reinforcements were
believed to be influenced by the answers given on the video tape. The
table also lists the correlations between the decision freedom items
and the other variables.
In the two previous studies in this series, no distinction was
made between attributed decision freedom and attributed outcome freedom.
Bringle, Lehtinen and Steiner (1973) and Davidson and Steiner (1971)
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Table 13
Correlation Matrix for Selected
Variables
Answers
Determined
by Tape
Composite
Control
Score
Influence
of Thought
Processes
Composite
Outcome .36 ** .56 ** .41 **
Freedom
Answers
Determined
.43 .41 **
by Tape
Composite
Control .51 **
Score
Influence
of Thought
Processes
Consistency
Free to give
neither response
Free to reward
answer previously
punished
Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
Free to change mind
* p < .05 ** p < .01
Table 13
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(Continued)
Cons is- Free to give Free to reward
tency neither response answer previous-
ly punished
Composite
Outcome .33 ** .26 * .21 *
Freedom
Answers
Determined .45 ** .19 .10
by Tape
Composite
Control .31 ** .19 .03
Score
Influence
of Thought • .38 ** .20 .09
Processes
Consistency .08 .18
Free to give
neither response .36 **
Free to reward
answer previously
punished
Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
Free to change
mind
* p < .05 ** p < .01
Table 13
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(Continued)
Free to punish Free
answer previously to change Predict-
rewarded mind ability
Composite
Outcome
Freedom
.19 .12 .24 *
Answers
Determined
by Tape
Composite
Control
Score
.07
.05
-.07
-.08
.41 **
.29 **
Influence
of Thought
Processes
.16 -.03 .42 **
Consistency
Free to give
neither response
Free to reward
answer previously
punished
Free to punish
answer previously
rewarded
.17
.30 **
.75 **
.01
.24 *
.43 **
.39 **
.65 **
.11
.05
.05
Free to change
mind -.04
* p < .05 ** p < .01
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asked subjects how free the reinforcing agent had been to give rewards,
give punisliments, and, in general, how free he had been to give rein-
forcements any way he wanted (the last item v/as used only in Bringle,
Lehtinen and Steiner) . Because outcome freedom could be assumed to be
very high, responses to these inquiries were interpreted as reflecting
attributed decision freedom.
However, during preliminary stages of the present study it became
apparent that subjects were sometimes responding to these items in a
manner that reflected outcome freedom. For this reason, a change from
previous research was instituted. The three items were introduced with
the following short paragraph:
The following questions concern the [participant's] freedom
to carry out any plan or intention he may have had. Once he
had decided how he wanted to reward and punish, how free was he
to do what he wanted to do?
It was felt that this preliminary statement would definitely provide a
set or frame of reference in which the items would be treated by the
subjects as dealing v/ith outcome freedom. (The decision freedom items
were introduced with a paragraph that stressed the participant's
freedom to decide.)
The consistency of the correlations reported in Table 13 suggests
that the measure of outcome freedom possessed moderately high construct
validity. However, freedom is a nebulous concept, and we may doubt
that any set of instructions will assure the validity of subject's
ratings'. When, as in the present study, subjects are asked to distin-
guish between two kinds of freedom, the problem is compounded. One
cannot conclude that the items employed in the present research
were
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wholly satisfactory, or that we have created measures that can confi-
dently be used in subsequent studies.
Role Differences
As already noted, a question of current interest to social psych-
ologists concerns the attribution of observers v£. participants. In
the present study an attempt was made to create circumstances under
which observers and participants received very similar information. If
the two kinds of subjects were found to make similar attributions,
support would have been generated for Bern's (1965, 1967, 1968) con-
tention that observers and participants employ parallel inference
processes. But if the attributions of observers were found to differ
markedly from those of participants, one could more readily accept
Jones and Nisbett's (1971) thesis that observers and participants
process information in different ways or have access to unique sources
of information. Although much of the evidence of the present study
appears to favor the latter conclusion, some of the findings seem con-
sistent with Bern's theory.
In the Control Group observers and participants were exposed to
the same conditions as were their counterparts in experimental groups,
except that no information concerning the participant's reinforcing
behaviors was supplied to them. Under these circiimstances observers
and participants expressed similar judgments in response to all but
three of forty-one items on the questionnaire. Observers expected
the participant's reinforcing behavior to be significantly more pre-
dictable and helpful and less completely determined by the video-taped
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subject's performance, than did participants. But in other respects
observers and participants did not differ significantly. Failure to
reject the null hypothesis does not establish its credibility, but a
high proportion of failures is exactly what Bern's theory v;ould predict.
The fact that one member of the pair was a performer, and the other
merely observed, had few effects on the inferences members drew con-
cerning the participant's (largely unobservable) actions.
The general lack of differences in tlie Control Group also suggests
that the visual orientations of the participants and observers were not
significantly different. During the conditioning, reinforcement, and
check phases of the experiment, the subjects sat in chairs which both
faced the video monitor and display board. Although there was a
tendency on the part of many observers to rearrange this somewhat (in
that they usually positioned themselves so that they were able to watch
the participant and the video monitor) this evidently had little effect
in creating significantly different "perceptual orientations."
More positive support for Bem's contention is provided by data
pertinent to Hypothesis Four. In experimental groups both observers
and participants were more prone to conclude that the participant v^o
consistently reinforced Entity A believed it to be the correct one than
to conclude that the participant who inconsistently reinforced Entity A
believed it to be correct. Thus participants, like observers, apparently
decided they must like that which their behavior consistently endorsed,
even though the behavioral endorsements were entirely engineered by
the experimenter. This finding is reminiscent of Bem's contention that
a person concludes he must like brown bread because he so often eats it.
64
However, we should note that observers were even more inclined than
participants to attribute a preference for Entity A when reinforcements
consistently endorsed it. Thus, although the data on attributed prefer-
ences support Bem's theory, they leave an important observer-participant
difference unexplained.
Evidence favoring the Jones-Nisbett contention is abundantly repre-
sented in the data generated by experimental groups. Both the absolute
and the difference scores reveal numerous differences between the in-
ferences of observers and participants. Thus, when compared to the
participants, absolute scores indicate that observers thought that:
*.
. . the reinforcements were more strongly determined by
the answers on the video tape.
*.
. . reinforcing every trial is a better strategy when one
isn't sure which answer is correct.
*.
. . the participant possessed greater outcome freedom.
*.
. . the discrepancy between the control of the thumb
responses in general, and during the reinforcement phase
of the experiment, was smaller.
. . . position A in the perceptual discrimination task was
the correct position.
. . . the participant ought to reinforce every trial in order
to please the experimenter.
. . . the participant had greater control over the respoiises.
. . . the control over the responses, and the generosity and
stinginess of the participant, were more important in deter-
mining the reinforcement responses.
. . . their (the observer's) own beliefs about how the partici-
pant should reward and punish were less important.
Items marked with asterisks also produced significant role effects
when analyzed in terras of difference scores. In addition, several
items revealed role differences only when responses were cast in the
form of difference scores. Thus, difference scores indicated that
observers thought that:
. . . the participant's behavior was less consistent, pre-
dictable, helpful, and fair than expected.
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... it was less necessary for the participant to punish an
incorrect answer, and less unnecessary to reward a correct
answer.
. . .
the reinforcing behavior warranted less revision toward
an internal explanation.
It is to be recalled that observers and participants received
essentially identical information concerning the situation. But the
numerous differences cited above indicate that the information had
different consequences on the inferences of participants and observers.
The fact that there were few Role differences among the Control Group
subjects, but many Role differences among the experimental subjects
indicates support for the Jones and Nisbett thesis that, when externally
available information is virtually identical, the inferences of the
observer and actor can differ.
Of the four factors which Bern (1972) listed as possible causes of
divergent perceptions, knowledge of past experiences and perceptual
differences between actor and observer were virtually eliminated, and
defensiveness was held to a minimtim. In addition, internal stimuli of
a physiological nature (e.g., proprioceptive feedback) was virtually
eliminated. However, as mentioned earlier, the participant had access
to one source of information to which the observer did not: The partici-
pant ' s Intentions .
The participant's knowledge of his own intentions should be ex-
pected to affect his attributions, but not those of an observer, when
his observable behaviors are not consistent with those intentions.
These are the conditions that prevailed in Experimental Groups. But
in Control Groups no feedback was provided, and participants had no
way of learning that their behavior was inconsistent with their
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Intentions. Consequently, it is not surprising that many Role differ-
ences were obtained from Experimental Groups, but very few from Control
Groups.
Some of the Role differences obtained from Experimental Groups
are especially pertinent to the foregoing argument. If the crucial
factor was the participant's awareness that his intentions were not
being realized, we should expect him to report low control of his own
behavior. We might also expect him to conclude that his behavior was not
greatly influenced by the quality of the responses given by the video-
taped subject, and to be less convinced than the observer that the
position he reinforced was the correct one. These expectations are
supported by the data. Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that
the experimental participant's awareness of his own intentions was a
major determinant of participant-observer differences.
These findings are of crucial importance to the confrontation
between Bern, and Jones and Nisbett. Bern's earlier statements (Bern,
1965, 1967) suggested that the behavior of the actor was the most
important information upon which he based his inferences. And, since
the behavior was available to the observer as well, their inferences
would be identical. However, these findings suggest that it v;as
knowledge of behavior plus intentions that was responsible for dif-
ferences between the inferences of participants and observers. Thus,
equal information concerning the environment and overt behavior is not
enough. The findings support the Jones and Nisbett theory, and imply
a need for Bern to add to his theoretical formulation the sources
of
divergence (Bern, 1972). Specifically, they indicate that the intention
of the actor is an important type of information, usually available
only to the actor, which cannot be neglected in theories of attribution
and inference. Indeed, it may be the knowledge of intentions and
preferences which creates what Jones and Nisbett identify as the ten-
dency for actors to explain their behavior with external attributions
since they know that things do not always go the way they intend or
desire, whereas observers do not.
These findings also provide strong evidence for the use of differ-
ence scores in attribution research. While it is important to know
whether participants and observers differ in their final inferences
after having observed a behavior, it is equally important that one knov?
what caused that difference. This information is only available if one
knows what an individual's inference was prior to having observed the
behavior. Similarities and differences between the analyses of the
absolute and difference scores illustrate the importance of both kinds
of information. The present research provided examples of variables
that yielded significant Role differences on only the absolute scores
(suggesting that several factors influenced the difference) , on only
the difference scores, and on both the absolute and difference scores
(indicating, in this case, that it was the observation of the behavior
that produced the significant differences). It is apparent that much
information is either erroneously assumed or ignored if the absolute
scores, alone, are considered.
The use of difference scores, then, provides a means by which one
can better understand the processes of attributions. Nisbett e^ al
•
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(1973) stated that this is the most critical test of any research in the
area. The present findings suggest at least one process that can
result in divergent inferences between actor and observer: The avail-
ability, to the actor, of information about what he expected or tried
to do.
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FOOTNOTES
'"Tills research was partially supported by a grant from the United
States Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, No. m
20169, Ivan D. Steiner, Principal Investigator.
2
On the actual questionnaire, the participant was referred to as
"subject" and the person on the video tape was referred to as "partici-
pant." To maintain consistency within this manuscript, the subject to
whom the electrodes were connected will be referred to as the "partici-
pant" and the person in the tape will be referred to as the "subject"
on the video tape. These changes are bracketed when items are reported.
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SCHEDULES
High Consistency-90% A
Position
Trial Response Endorsed
1. +6 A
2. -3 A
3. -3 B
4. -3 A
5.
6. +6 A
7. -3 A
8. +6 A
9. +6 A
10. -3 A
11. +6 A
12 . +6 B
13. +6 A
lA.
15. -3 A
16. -3 A
17. +6 A
18. -3 A
19 . +6 A
20. -3 A
REINFORCEMENT
High Consistency-B-^A
Position
Trial Response Endorsed
1. -3 B
21 +6 B
3. +6 A
4. +6 B
5.
6. -3 B
7. +6 B
8. -3 B
9. -3 B
10. +6 B
11. +6 A
12.
13. -3 B
14. +6 A
15. -3 A
16. -3 A
17. +6 A
18. -3 A
19. +6 A
20. -3 A
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High Consistency-A & B
Position
Trial Response Endorsed
1. +6 A
2. +6 •au
3. -3 •R
4. -3 A
5. -3 A
6. +6 A
7.
8. -3 B
9. +6 A
4-6 Ita
11. -3 B
12. +6 6
13. +6 A
14. -3 B
15.
16. -3 A
17. +6 A
18. -3 A
19. -3 B
20. +6 B
Low Consistency-90% A
Position
Trial Response Endorsed
1i
.
1 T O+12 A
Z
J
-5 A
c
_> .
D . 1 1 o AA
/ . +y B
QO .
Q
10. -7 A
11.
12. -4 A
13.
14. +11 A
15. -6 A
16.
17.
18. -5 A
19. +9 A
20.
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Low Consistency-B~>A Low Consistency-A & B
Trial Response
Position
Endorsed Trial
Position
Response Endorsed
1. 1. +12 A
2. +12 B 2.
3. -5 B 3. -5 B
4. 4.
5. +13 B 5. +13 B
6. 6.
7. +9 B 7.
8. 8. +9 A
9. -7 B 9. -7 B
10. 10.
11. +11 A 11. +11 A
12. -4 A 12. -4 A
13. 13.
14. 14. -6 B
15. -6 A 15.
16. 16.
17. 17.
18. -5 A 18. -5 A
19. +9 A 19.
20. 20. +9 B
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Script
(Subjects are seated at the table as they arrive at the laboratory.)
This experiment deals with learning and reinforcement. Psychologists
are extremely interested in reinforcement because of its importance
in the learning experience, and past research has investigated such
things as what types of reinforcers are best, when should they be give:
and how they influence the learning process. This experiment is in-
terested in how people administer reinforcements under various circum-
stances .
You each will assume different roles in the experiment. One of you
will be the participant and will take part in the entire experiment.
The other one will simply observe the entire proceedings of the
experiment. In order to select which role each of you will assume,
we will allow the person whose last name comes first in the alpha-
bet to be the participant.
Before we begin, would you each fill out a short questionnaire. Please
read the instructions before beginning and respond to all items. (The
MacDonald-Tseng Internal-External scale is administered.)
(Directed to the subject selected as observer:) As I said, you will
observe the entire experiment. Please sit here.
(Directed to the participant:) Please sit here. The initial phase of
the experiment deals with conditioning a response in each of your hands.
This is done so that we may use the conditioned responses during a
later phase of the experiment. You will be exposed to an escape-
avoidance task which I will explain in detail. You will wear a set
of earphones through which will be played music. In addition, a
noise will occasionally interrupt the music. By making the appro-
priate response you can escape the noise after it has come on. Also
by making the appropriate response you can avoid the noise by delay-
ing its onset. That is, you can turn off or delay the noise by making
the correct response.
The responses we will be conditioning during the escape-avoidance
procedure are small thumb responses in each of your hands. Let me
explain their nature. Muscle behavior creates an electrical voltage.
Even when the muscle response is so small as to be invisible, this
voltage can be measured. In our case, the measuring will be done by
an electromyograph. Electrodes, which will be connected to your
hand, will lead to an electronic amplifier which multiplies the voltage.
The appropriate response which the electromyograph will be recording,
and the only response, is a small muscle twitch which is too small to
be perceived by you. The voltages produced by this muscle twitch are,
as you might expect, extremely small. They vary from one to three
microvolts. Please note that you can not evoke the correct response
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by actively moving your thumb since this response is ton Ki. ^.on the electromyograph and is filtered out. 'S". in o^der'for the"appropriate response to become conditioned, you m^st sit in the chairand keep your hands and body relaxed at all ii.es; also you must not
17.eTfl~ ^^-'^ - since^th^rwiU
^Jj^h ^hen the noise comes on, if a small thumb
rllf , / -ill be turned off for the
IT .t''\f K ''^^ interval. Also, if the noise is off and youmke the thumb twitch, you will postpone or avoid the onset of thenoise for five seconds. Thus, if you respond at the rate of at leastone proper response every five seconds when the noise is off, thenoise will remain off indefinitely. In addition, the appropriate re-
ITTrllll h^'/^i'T'' alternate from left to right hand. Thus,t a right and thumb response delays the noise for a five secondinterval, a left hand thumb response will delay it for the next five
second interval, and so on. The conditioning session will last 11
minutes, and there will be one minute of music before the conditioninc^begins. Remember that during the conditioning phase it is necessaryto remain relaxed; keep your arms, hands and fingers still. Are there
any questions?
(To the observer:) In order that you can hear the conditioning process,
you will also be able to listen through a set of earphones. (The elec-
trodes are then connected to the participant and earphones are given toboth subjects.)
(The experimenter leaves the room and plays the 11 minute tape of music
and noise.)
That completes the conditioning phase of the experiment. The condi-
tioning of the two thumb responses is very strong and you have good
control of the responses in each of your hands.
The subsequent part of the experiment investigates the reinforcing
behavior of individuals. You will be shown a video tape of an experi-
mental session filmed last semester. The tape shows a person who
is working on a perceptual discrimination task which I will explain.
The person was shown pairs of lines which differed in length by a
small amount; it was his task to judge which of the two lines was the
longer. As the experiment progressed, the difference between the two
lines slowly became greater. The experimenter was interested in
determining at what point the subject would be able to reliably deter-
mine which line was the longer of the two. The experiment ended when
the subject was able to give six correct answers in a row. Initially,
the discrimination task was extremely difficult, and it took subjects,
on the average, about fifty trials before they were able to produce
the six correct answers. The particular subject whose performance you
will be watching was able to complete the experiment in just under the
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50 trial average. You are going to be shown, however, only a portion ofthose trials— the first twenty trials.
Although the person was not given the following information, we aregoing to tell you that the longer line was always in the same position
on the card. That is, the longer line was always either on the left
side or on the right side. Thus, although you don't know at this timein which position the longer line was, you do know it was always in
the same position.
In the conditioning phase, the music and noise assumed the role of
stimulus for the thumb responses. Now we are presenting the tape
of the perceptual discrimination experiment as a stimulus. We want
to see how you react to the person's performance as you view it.
Specifically, we want to see how the conditioned thumb responses
react to the video tape v/hen they represent reinforcements. Thus,
your thumb responses will represent reinforcements, and we will be
recording how you give reinforcements as you watch the tape.
Following each response by the person on the tape, the center light
on this display panel will come on for 10 seconds. Any thumb responses
you produce during this 10 second period will be recorded on the dials
of the panel. 1 The counters on the panel will represent the total amount
of reinforcements to the person on the tape. 2 Any responses emitted
by the right hand will constitute a reward and will represent adding
five cents to the total. The rewards will be sho\m on the top counters.
^
Any responses emitted by the left hand will constitute a punishment and
will represent deducting five cents from the total. These punishments
will be shown on the bottom counters. 2 The money represented by
your responses is symbolic and will represent what you would have
given the person for his performance had he actually been doing the
task as part of the present experiment. We are also interested in
when you don't give reinforcem.ents , as well as when you do give them,
since not giving reinforcements can be an important and significant
behavior in a learning setting.
For the Control Group subjects, this sentence was amended to read,
".
. . will be recorded in the other room, but will not be recorded on
these dials."
2
For the Control Group subjects, these sentences were omitted from
the instructions.
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At the beginning of the conditioning you had no control over the thumb
responses. As the conditioning progressed, your thought processes
gradually learned to influence them. Past research has demonstrated
that when the conditioned thumb responses assume the role of reinforce-
ments, they give an indication of some of the thought processes that
are taking place. Your job, then, is to watch the person's performance
on the video tape, and we will be recording when you give and don't
give reinforcements.
Remember, because we are using the conditioned responses as reinforce-
ments, it is necessary for you to remain as relaxed as possible during
the experiment and to not make any extraneous movements, particularly
during the 10 second reinforcement period following each trial. Do
you have any questions?
(The experimenter then leaves the room and the reinforcement phase of
the experiment is administered.)
That concludes the reinforcement phase of the experiment. I now want
to run a short 4 minute escape-avoidance session similar to the one .
given at the start of the experiment. This is being done in order to
recheck the amount of control you have over the conditioned responses
and to check for any improvement that may have occured during the
reinforcement phase. Remember to remain relaxed.
(The experimenter then leaves the room and the 4 minute tape is played.)
The conditioning is still very strong and you have good control of the
responses in both hands.
In order to get your impressions of the experiment I want each of you
to fill out a questionnaire. Please read the instructions before you
begin and respond to all items. If any are unclear or you have a
question, please ask. I'll figure the net amount of reinforcement,
which should be entered in the first blank.
3
(After the questionnaires have been filled out:) That concludes the
experiment, please write your name and address on this paper so that
I can send you an explanation of the experiment and a brief summary
of the results.
For the Control Group subjects, the procedure for figuring the net
reinforcement was explained, so that they could estimate an amount
for the first blank on the questionnaire.
APPENDIX III
PARTICIPMT AND OBSERVER
QUESTIONNAIRES
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READ THE COMPLETE ITEM BEFORE RECORDING YOUR RESPONSE. DO NOT OMITANY ITEM.
What was the net reinforcement you gave to the participant in the
video tape? (Enter the amount)
i
Approximately ICQ subjects will participate in the experiment as
you have just done. What do you think will be the average net
reinforcement to the participant in the video tape?
$
How would you describe or characterize your rewarding and punishing
behavior? (Indicate your response with a check mark)
Inconsistent
: : : : : : : : : : Consistent123456789
Unpredictable
: : : : : : : : : : Predictable123456789
Very Unhelpful
: : :
_: : : :
_: : : Very Helpful123456789
Very Unfair : : : : : : : : : : Very Fair123456789
Undesirable : : : : : : : : : : Desirable12345678 9
The following items concern how you feel as you watched the video tape.
Specifically, we want to know how free you felt to make up your o\m
mind about how the participant in the video tape should be rewarded or
punished. Did you feel that the participant's behavior and the nature
of the experiment made one course of action far more appropriate than
any other? Or, did you feel you were free to try any strategy you
wished on any trial?
To what degree were the rewards and punishments you gave determined by
the answers given by the participant in the video tape?
Completely Completely
Undetermined : ; " ; : : : : : : : Determined123456789
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To what degree did you feel that it was unnecessary to reward theparticipant every time he gave an answer you believed to be correct?
Completely
_
,
TT : : : : CompletelyUnnecessary * • • • • _' „123456789 Necessary
To what degree did you feel that it was unnecessary to punish theparticipant every time he gave an answer you believed to be incorrect?
Completely
_ Completely
Unnecessary —— Necessary
To what degree did you feel that rewarding and punishing every trial
might be a bad strategy when you aren't real sure which answer is
correct?
Definitely a
.
, , /
_ ^ ^
Definitely a
Bad Strategy
^ood Strategy
To what degree did you feel that you ought to be rewarding or punishing
every trial in order to please the experimenter?
Very
. Very
Unimportant ' " ' ' * * ' * * ' Important123456789
How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, that the
participant deserved neither reward nor punishment?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, to reward
the participant for an answer you had previously punished?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
How free did you feel to decide, on each particular trial, to punish
the participant for an answer you previously rewarded?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free
On each particular trial, how free did you feel to change your mind
about which answer should be rewarded and which should be punished?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
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The following questions concern your freedom to carry out any plan or
intention you may have had. Once you had decided how you wanted to
reward or punish, how free were you to do what you wanted to do?
How free were you _to give rewards and punishments to the participant
in the video tape when you wanted to do so?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : :_ : Very Free123456789
How free were you to. withhold rewards and punishments from the parti-
cipant in the video tape when you wanted to do so?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
In general, how free were you to reinforce the participant the way
you wanted to?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free
1 2 345 6 789
How would you describe the way in which you rewarded and punished
the person in the video tape during the reinforcement period, in terms
of percentages?
Rewarded about % of the trials
Punished about Z of the trials
Neither rewarded nor punished about % of the trials
Both rewarded and punished about
'
% of the trials
Although you did not know which was the correct position before, now
that you've seen the film, which position do you now think was the
correct position in the perceptual discrimination experiment?
Certain it was Certain it was
Position B : : : : : : : : • * Position A
Not
Sure
How much control do you believe you possessed over the conditioned
thumb responses?
No Control : : : : : : : : : ' Total Control
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How much control did you feel you exercised over the amount of money
you gave during the reinforcement session?
No Control : : : : : : : : : ; xotal Control123456789
How relaxed were you during the reinforcement session?
Very Tense : : : : : : : : Very Relaxed123456789
Approximately 100 subjects will participate in the experiment as you
have just done. On the average, how do you think they will reward
and punish the person in the video tape during the reinforcement phase,
in terms of percentages?
They will reward about 7o of the trials
They will punish about % of the trials
They will neither reward nor pxinish about % of the trials
They will both reward and punish about 7o of the trials
If you had been allowed to give the reinforcements voluntarily rather
than using the conditioned thumb responses as the reinforcements, how
do you think you would have reinforced, in terms of percentages?
(Assume that you would have watched the same person in the same tape.)
Would have rewarded about % of the trials
Would have punished about 7o of the trials
Would have neither rewarded nor punished about 7o of the
trials
Would have both rewarded and punished about 7o of the trials
The following items concern your Impressions of the kinds of factors
that may have influenced the way you rewarded and/or punished the
participant. How important were each of the following considerations
in influencing your behaviors?
Your belief that one of the positions was correct?
Unimportant : :: : : : : : : • ' Important123456789
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Your belief that equity and fair play demand that people get what
they deserve.
Unimportant : : : : :
_: : : : : Important
1 2 34 5 6 7 89
Your control over the conditioned thumb responses.
Unimportant : :
_: : : : : : : : Important123456789
Your estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination
task.
Unimportant : : : : : : : : : Important123456789
Your belief that the observer would want you to reward and punish
in a certain way?
Unimportant : : : : : : : ' : : Important123456789
Your own generosity or stinginess.
Unimportant : : : : : : : ' : Important123456789
Which of the following four alternative causes is the most probable
cause of the way in which you reinforced? Indicate your choice by
circling the letter next to the cause which you think is more probable.
If you choose "d", specify the particular combination of factors that
you think caused your behavior. For example, a and b, or a and c,
or b and c, or a, b, and c.
a. Something about you probably caused you to make the
responses you made to the video taped experiment.
b. Something about the person in the video tape and his
performance probably caused you to make the responses you
made to the video taped experiment.
c. Something about the particular circumstances of the experi
-
ment you are participating in probably caused you to make
the responses you made to the video taped experiment.
d. Some combination of the above factors probably caused you
to make the responses you made to the video taped experiment.
Specify the combination:
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How a person behaves depends upon a number of factors. At one extremeare some behavaors which are a result of external causes and pressures(causes outside the person). At the other extreme are some beSavJorswhich are the result of internal causes or reasons (causes insidltheperson
.
Consider
-the reinforcements that you have just given theparticipant xn the video tape, do you consider that those reinforce-ments were mainly due to external factors, mainly due to internalfactors, or reflected some mixture of internal and external factors''Ulark your response with a slash (that is, / ) on the linebelow.) ' -Lxut:
Mainly due 50% external M^l^ly dueto external 50% internal to internalfactors
-
factors
How much influence do you think your thought processes had on your
conditioned thumb responses during the reinforcement phase of the
experiment?
No influence
: : : : : : .. : .
. Total influence123A56789
In terms of percentages, how frequently did your reinforcements endorse
a particular position (that is, reward when the position was selected
and punish when the other position was selected)?
Endorsed position A about
'i of the trials
Endorsed position B about
^% of the trials
Endorsed neither position A nor B about "L of the trials
How hard did you try to reward a correct response and punish an in-
correct response?
Didn't Try Tried Very
At All Much
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READ THE COMPLETE ITEM BEFORE RECORDING YOUR RESPONSE. DO NOT OMIT
ANY ITEMS. PLEASE NOTE THAT "SUBJECT" REFERS TO THE PERSON IfflO
PARTICIPATED IN THE EXPERIMENT, NOT YOURSELF.
What was the net reinforcement the subject gave to the participant
in the video tape? (Enter the amount)
^
Approximately ICQ subjects will participate in the experiment as the
subject has just done. What do you think will be the average net
reinforcement to the participant in the video tape?
i
How would you describe or characterize the subject's rewarding and
punishing behavior? (Indicate your response with a check mark)
Inconsistent : : : : : : : : : : Consistent123A56789
Unpredictable : : : : : : : : : : Predictable123456789
Very Unhelpful : : : : : : : : : Very Helpful123456789
Very Unfair : : : : : : : : : : Very Fair123456789
Undesirable : : : : : : : *. ' • Desirable123456789
The following items concern how you think the subject felt as he watched
the video tape. Specifically, we want to know how free you think he
felt to make up his ovm mind about how the participant in the video
tape should be rewarded or punished. Did he feel that the participant's
behavior and the nature of the experiment made one course of action far
more appropriate than any other? Or, did he feel he was free to try
any strategy he wished on any trial?
To what degree were the rewards and punishments the subject gave
determined by the answers given by the participant in the video tape?
Completely
: :
Completely
Undetermined *—
*—
'~r'"r'~r'"r'"r "T ^^^^^^""^^
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To what degree did the subject feel that it was unnecessary to reward
the participant every time he gave an answer which the subject believed
to be correct?
Completely ..... Completely
Unnecessary '-t— '• • —
—
*
—
:
—
*
* ' ' '
* Ni^(-p<;t;flrv
^ 123456789 r^ecessary
To what degree did the subject feel that it was unnecessary to punish
the participant every time he gave an answer he believed to be
incorrect?
Completely Completely
Unnecessary *"y"'~2~'~'~4~'~^ *~5~*~7~ Necessary
To what degree did the subject feel that rewarding and punishing every
trial might be a bad strategy when he isn't real sure which answer
is correct?
Definitely a Definitely a
Bad Strategy
*"Y"*~Y""~J"'"y~*"3~*~6"'"y" Good Strategy
To what degree did the subject feel that he ought to be rewarding or
punishing every trial in order to please the experimenter?
Very Very
Unimportant
'~X~"~2~~*~~3~*"~A~'~5~~'~6~''~7~*~"8~'~9~*
Important
How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, that
the participant deserved neither reward nor punishment?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : *• Very Free123456789
How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
reward the participant for an answer he had previously punished?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
How free did the subject feel to decide, on each particular trial, to
punish the participant for an answer he previously rewarded?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : ' ' ' Very Free
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On each particular trial, how free did the subject feel to change his
mind about which answer should be rewarded and which should be punished?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free12 345 6 7 89
The following questions concern the subject's freedom to carry out
any plan or j.ntention he may have had. Once he had decided how he
wanted to reward or punish, how free was he to do what he wanted to
do?
How free was the subject _to give rewards and punishments to the parti-
cipant in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
How free was the subject _to withhold rewards and punishments from the
participant in the video tape when he wanted to do so?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
In general, how free was the subject to reinforce the participant the
V7ay he wanted to?
Very Unfree : : : : : : : : : : Very Free123456789
How would you describe the way invhich the subject rewarded and pun-
ished the person in the video tape during the reinforcement period,
in terms of percentages?
Rewarded about % of the trials
Punished about % of the trials
Neither rewarded nor punished about % of the trials
Both rewarded and punished about 7o of the trials
Although the subject did not know which was the correct position before,
now that he has seen the film, which position does he think was the
correct position in the perceptual discrimination experiment?
Certain it was
Position B
Certain it was
-• • • •
* * Position A
Not
Sure
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How much control do you think the subject believed he possessed over
the conditioned thumb responses?
No Control : : : : : : : : : : Total Control
•1 2 34 5 6 7 89
How much control did the subject feel he exercised over the amount of
money he gave during the reinforcement session?
No Control : : : : : : : : : : Total Control123456789
How relaxed was the subject during the reinforcement session?
Very Tense : : : : : : : : : Very Relaxed123456789
Approximately 100 subjects will participate in the experiment as the
subject has just done. On the average, how do you think they will
reward and punish the person in the video tape during the reinforce-
ment phase, in terms of percentages?
They will reward about % of the trials
They will punish about 7o of the trials
They will neither reward nor punish about 7o of the trials
They will both reward and punish about % of the trials
If the subject had been allowed to give reinforcements voluntarily
rather than using the conditioned thumb responses as the reinforcements,
how do you think he would have reinforced, in terms of percentages?
(Assume that he would have watched the same person in the same tape.)
Would have rewarded about % of the trials
Would have punished about of the trials
Would have neither rewarded nor punished about 'i of
the trials
Would have both rewarded and punished about % of the
trials
The following items concern your impressions of the kinds of factors
that may have influenced the way the subject rewarded and/or punished
the participant. How important were each of the following considera-
tions in influencing his behavior?
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His belief that one of the positions was correct?
Unimportant : : : : : : : : : : Important123456789
His belief that equity and fair play demand that people get what
they deserve.
Unimportant : : : : : : : : : : Important123456789
His control over the conditioned thumb responses.
Unimportant : : : : : : : : : : Important123456789
His estimate of the difficulty of the perceptual discrimination
task.
Unimportant : : : : : : : : : ' Important123456789
His -belief that you would want him to reward and punish in a
certain way.
Unimportant : : : : : : : : • • Important123456789
His own generosity and stinginess.
Unimportant : : : : : : = : • • Important123456789
Which of the following four alternative causes is the most probable
cause of the way in which the subject reinforced? Indicate your choice
by circling the letter next to the cause which you think is most
probable. If you choose "d", specify the particular combination of
factors that you think caused his behavior. For example, a and b, or
a and c, or b and c, or a, b, and c.
a. Something about the subject probably caused him to make
the responses he made to the video taped experiment.
b. Something about the person in the video tape and his per-
formance probably caused him to make the responses he made
to the video taped experiment.
c. Something about the particuJ ar circumstances of
the experi-
ment he is participating in probably caused him to make
the responses he made to the video taped experiment.
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d. Some combination of the above factors probably caused him
to make the responses he made to the video taped experiment.
Specify the combination:
How a person behaves depends upon a number of factors. At one extreme
are some behaviors v^hich are a result of external causes and pressures
(causes outside the person) . At the other extreme are some behaviors
which are the result of internal causes or reasons (causes inside
the person). Consider the reinforcements that the subject just gave
to the participant in the video tape, do you consider that those rein-
forcements were mainly due to external factors, mainly due to internal
factors, or reflected some mixture of internal and external factors?
(Mark your response with a slash, (that is, I ) on the line
below.
)
Mainly due 50% external Mainly due
to external 50% internal to internal
factors factors
How much influence do you think the subject's thought processes had
on his conditioned thumb responses during the reinforcement phase of
the experiment?
No Influence : : : : : : ' • ' • Total Influence123456789
In terras of percentages, how frequently did the subject's reinforce-
ments endorse a particular position (that is, reward when the position
was selected and punish when the other position was selected)?
Endorsed position A about 7o of the trials
Endorsed position B about % of the trials
Endorsed neither position A nor B about 7" of the trials
How hard did the subject try to reward a correct response and punish
an incorrect response?
Didn't Try
At All
Tried Very
Much


